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Recovery from a large disaster event is a complex process. It is a process of life recovery, where part of the past no longer 
exists and what is the future depends on many decisions that 
involve people we sometimes do not know. City planners cer­
tainly can be of help in the recovery process as usually there 
are many land use, city design, sustainability, community de­
velopment, safety and transportation issues involved. While 
people would like to live in the same place as they did before a 
disaster, many times this is not possible; so in part, recovery is 
about inventing the future. 
Since 2008, large scale disasters have occurred all over the
world including the United States (floods and wildfires), Italy
(earthquake), Brazil (landslides), Australia (floods and wildfires),
China (earthquake and land slides), Chile (earthquake and tsu­
nami), New Zealand (earthquakes and earth deformation), and
Japan (earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear). Thousands of people
Figure 1: Damage caused by reported natural disasters 1975­
2010. (source: Center for Research on Epidemiology of Disasters 
(CRED). 2012. International Disaster Data Base, Catholic Univer­
sity of Louvain, Brussels, Belgium. (http://www.emdat.be/) 
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have lost their lives in some of these events and the overall
losses and cost of reconstruction is close to $500 billion dollars.
Increasing damage costs are the trend over the past three de­
cades (Figure 1).
In all large disasters the central (national) government is called 
upon to provide support in terms of financial and technical 
assistance, as well to provide a leadership role in designing 
the strategy for recovery. In less developed countries, central 
government struggles to provide leadership and resources. 
In developed countries, the central government plays a major 
role with direct management of the recovery process or, as in 
the United States, it supplies funding and technical support. 
In this way recovery becomes a partnership, however unequal 
between the survivors (people and businesses) and govern­
ment. The way the partnerships are formed and carried out de­
termines the path to recovery. These partnerships evolve and 
adapt to changing conditions in real time. 
This article discusses three countries (Japan, Chile, New Zea­
land) where I visited the disaster areas, spoke to the local 
people and worked with NGOs and government agencies to 
understand the recovery process and assist in it. What they 
have in common is that they have suffered their largest disas­
ter event in modern history between the years 2010-2011, all 
at the hands of an earthquake. These events also are multi­
locational, spanning more than a single city, district, or state. 
They occurred along coastal areas, inland, and in some cases 
impacted cities for hundreds of kilometers. The vast spatial 
mix in locations, in topography, in geology, and in impact to 
historic sites creates complex planning challenges. All of these 
countries are advanced societies in terms of economic status, 
functioning democratic practices, and stable governments. 
They suffer not from threats of war and social conflict, but from 
multi-natural hazard threats. Can their recovering process 
make these areas more resilient against future threats and pos­
sibly more sustainable? Can design approaches help, and how 
do planners begin to understand the needs of the local people 
and help them? 
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The time frame used in this paper is two years or less from the 
initial event(s). This is not enough time for an assessment of 
comprehensive recovery, but enough time to establish the re­
covery strategy and the types of partnerships between the sur­
vivors and their governments. While each country adapts and 
recovers in its own way, central government involvement is a 
constant, although expressed in different ways. While there is a 
common saying that “all disaster is local,” there is also a reality 
that “all local disaster survivors want the central government to 
help them with the damage to their lives and property.” 
While each country has its own story based on its own histori­
cal context, all have things in common. They are prone to seis­
mic, volcanic, and tsunami events. For example, Japan experi­
ences 20% of all 6.0 magnitude and above earthquakes while 
living on just one percent of the earth’s surface. Each country 
has a long coastline that is subject to tsunami events. There 
are also clear differences with Japan having a history of at least 
two thousand years, while Chile (established in 1818) and New 
Zealand (established in 1840) are younger countries with Euro­
pean roots. Chile was a former colony of Spain with immigrant 
communities from Italy and Germany, and New Zealand has 
Anglo-Saxon roots as former colony of England and Scotland. 
They have differing governmental systems and democratic tra­
ditions. All have legal planning systems for the regulation of 
land use, buildings construction and public safety. 
Growing Interest in Disaster Risk Reduction 
The recognition that large scale disasters cause increasing
amounts of property damage and extensive disruption to the
local economy has led governments in industrialized countries
to seek to lower impacts using two major strategies. First are
structural measures that strengthen the built environment. Bet­
ter building codes, higher levees, stronger bridges are examples
of such measures. The other strategy is non-structural measures.
Avoiding building in a high flood area or on top of an earth­
quake fault, removing brush from around buildings, and estab­
lishing evacuation routes, and buying insurance are examples of
non-structural actions. A third strategy also has emerged; it can
be called “behavioral.” This includes educating people to under­
stand hazard risks and taking some actions to lower impacts.
All of these strategies fall under a broader umbrella called di­
saster risk reduction. This paper uses a simple three-part frame­
work: assessment, dialogue and action ( Wisner et al., 2011). The
framework: Assessment, Dialogue and Action (Figure 2) is not
linear, but interactive; and I use it in this way. In reality, the com­
ponents and feedback provide information and iterate. In this
way they are a design process. Each, however, requires its own
time frame to complete, and can cause (as we see in the case
of New Zealand) considerable conflict as to how geo-seismic
knowledge is generated and then applied in the dialogue frame.
Assessment 
What caused the disaster in each country and what was its im-
Figure 2.  Integrated risk reduction framework. 
(source: Wisner et al., 2012) 
pact? Table 1 provides comparative information on the three 
countries related to the disaster event. The administrative re­
covery organization information is shown in Table 2. The Tim­
ing of Major Actions is presented in Table 3. These three tables 
create a disaster profile. 
The recovery plan or strategy, issued by the central government,
or its recovery agency, envisions a decade of effort. Why ten
years is a common number is not clear. Generally most central
governments realize that certain restoration actions are required
before reconstruction can take place, and that the complexity of
recovery in administrative, social, technical and administrative
terms simply takes time, more than is usually estimated. Each
country faces different technical and engineering challenges.
This is an important finding. It establishes that we need to know
a great deal about local conditions (geotechnical, topographic,
historical) in order to make proper recovery decisions. 
Japan, with its earthquake, tsunami and nuclear accident, faces 
the most difficult challenge of the three. Based on progress in 
year one, Iwate and Myagi prefectures can meet their ten-year 
goal. In the Fukushima prefecture it will take at least two gen­
erations to complete the tasks of decommissioning the nuclear 
plants and decontamination of the surrounding areas. 
Temporary housing 
With the loss of so many houses due to the tsunami, 55,000 
temporary units were built in Japan and installed within three 
months of the disaster. These are factory built units, assembled 
on site and fully serviced by power and water.  Most of these 
are scattered site clusters averaging 30-40 units, although 
some large 100-150-unit groups do exist. In some prefectures, 
private rentals have been used for temporary units. The central 
government pays the costs of this temporary housing. While a 
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Table 1:  Comparison of Japan, Chile, New Zealand earthquakes and related events, damages and costs. 
Country,	  Date	  of Incident Types of Hazard 
Causalities
(Deaths,
Missing) 
Major Cause of
Deaths 
Housing	  
Damaged
(Destroyed-­‐
Heavy Damage) 
Damaged Cities
and	  Larger
Districts 
Total Estimated
Economic	  Cost
($US billions) 
Major Disaster
Characteristics 
Japan, March	  11, 2011 
Earthquake -­‐
Tsunami &
Nuclear Accident 
19.294 Tsunami, 95% 359.000 
38 cities,	  3
prefectures 
235 
Nuclear	  accident,	  
most death and
damage due to
tsunami 
Chile,	  February,	  27,	  2010 
Earthquake -­‐
Tsunami 
541 
Building	  Collapse,	  
66% 
190.358 
52 cities,	  4
regions	  ** 
30 
Extensive	  coastal	  
damage from
tsunami, interior
damaged from
earthquake 
New Zealand,	  February	  22, 2011* 
Earthquake,	  Land
deformation* 
185 
Building	  Collapse,	  
78% 
100,00
damaged, 60%
CBD businesses
displaced 
3 cities,	  1 district 15 
Most damage due
to soils failure,	  
10,00
aftershocks 
* Multiple quakes over nine months, with the Feb. 22, 2011, 6.3 event causing loss of life. 
Sources: http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/6394084/February-earthquake-toll-hits-185 
http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/more-news/christchurch-earthquake-among-the-worlds-most-costly 
Table 2:  Administrative and plans comparison. 
Country 
Main Entity	  in
Charge of Recovery
and	  Reconstruction 
Headquarters of
Main Entity 
Estimated Years for
Recovery 
Assistance	  for Local
Recovery	  Plans 
Damaged Cities and	  
Larger Districts
Impacted 
Country	  Population
(millions) 
Japan 
Recovery Agency
Central	  
Government 
Tokyo,	  country	  
capital (with	  3
regional offices) 
10 (first five years	  
concentrated	  
effort) 
Local governmen
volunteer	  
professionals,	  and
hired consultants 
3 cities, 3 main
prefectures,	  5
other	  prefectures 
128 
Chile 
Ministry of 
Housing,	  Central	  
Government 
Santiago, country	  
capital 
10 
Consultants with 
local government 
52 cities,	  4
regions	  ** 
18 
New Zealand 
Recovery Agency
Central	  
Government 
Christ	  Church,	  
Canterbury 
District 
10 
Recovery	  Entity
NGOs,	  
3 cities,	  1 district 4,5 
** An additional 900 rural villages and communitites suffered damages. 
Table 3:  Timetable of major actions and events over two-year period. 
Country,	  Date	  o Incident 0-­‐month 6 Month 6-­‐12 Month 13-­‐18 Month 19-­‐24 
Recovery	  plan adopted by 60% of
local/prefect.	   gov’ts, 
Central	  Govt Recovery Agency started Specific projects	  started	  in cities 
Central	  Govt	  Guidelines issued First project funds	  issued	   Community	  development plans completed 
Japan, March	  2, 2011 All major infrastructure repaired Special Economic Zones	  funding began Renewable energy	  farm work begun 
55,000 temporary shelter units built. Nuclear restricted zone 20 km line in place 
Rezoning Plan for Fukushima evacuation
areas announced 
90% of work loss replaced 
National recovery plan	  issued 
128,000 subsidies awarded.	  -­‐53 Local
Master Reconstruction	  Plans and Strategic
Reconstruction Plans completed 
Complete	  award of 220,000 subsidies
Chile,	  February 2,	  2010 National Recovery Council in place 
Initial expropriate	  actions taken to create	  
tsunami barrier areas 
Start	  155,000 units
All major infrastructure repaired Completed	  86,000 units
Direct central gov’t projects in small towns
New Zealand,	  February	  22, 2011 
Canterbury	  Recovery Agency (CERA)	  
created 
Christ	  Church	  City	  Council	  complete
Central	  City Plan	  draft. 
Draft Recovery	  Strategy	  
Government to acquire 7,000 properties 
Regional infrastructure plan complete 
Replacement of major disaster designe
sewer	  and	  water	  lines	  begun	  (This is a
public private	  partnership.)	  
Recovery	  Strategy	  Finalized 
Central	  City	  Plan draft taken over by CERA
Planning	  unit. 
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two-year maximum stay was originally estimated, some areas 
will need to extend this up to five years due to difficulties in 
providing buildable sites. 
All of the fishing ports along the impacted coastline of Iwate, 
Myagi, and Fukushima prefectures suffered damages ranging 
from loss of boats, ropes for seaweed cultivation, to destruc­
tion of fish processing factories. After one year, new equip­
ment has been obtained and over 50% of the fishing fleet has 
returned to the sea. Due in part to a special government work 
support program all survivors and evacuees can get employ­
ment.  There is actually a shortage of labor in the Tohoku re­
gion due to all the recover work under way. 
New Zealand faces a dual challenge. The Canterbury district, 
located on the eastern coast of the South Island, experienced a 
series of earthquakes of large size and thousands of aftershocks 
over a nine-month period. The accumulation of quakes kept 
damaging more buildings and caused extensive soil deforma­
tion (liquefaction and lateral spread) over large areas of Christ 
Church’s central city and its eastern suburbs. This resulted in 
the demolition of half of all the buildings in the central busi­
ness district of Christchurch (the nation’s second largest city of 
380,000), and its landmark building, the Christchurch Anglican 
Cathedral, still scheduled to be torn down. Three thousand 
of the central business districts 5,000 businesses have been 
closed. The soil deformation is so extensive in eastern resi­
dential areas that over 7,000 houses have been declared non-
repairable and will be purchased by the central government. 
All the homeowners will need to find houses in other areas of 
the district. This will create a resettlement to areas away from 
the central city as new housing is built on available green-field 
sites identified in the Environment Canterbury district growth 
plan. The central city needs to be rebuilt as an attractive place 
for commerce, business, tourism, the arts and entertainment. 
Such an effort means that urban design needs to play a role in 
economic development as well as “public realm” creation. 
Chile faces the challenge of reconstruction of many cities 
along its coast and also in the interior. For coastal cities, safety 
from tsunami is the key land planning issue as well as prevent­
ing building where there is soil deformation in parts of the 
major cities of Concepción and Talcahuano. In the interior of 
the country the challenges are replacement of the thousands 
of adobe buildings and finding enough land that can be eas­
ily supplied with infrastructure services. The third challenge is 
restoration of the many historic buildings (mostly churches). 
The desire to restore many historic buildings made of adobe or 
unreinforced masonry has spawned new research in structur­
ally sound bricks and possibly the use of new plastic sheeting 
with similar structural characteristics. Until such research can 
be completed, hundreds of historic buildings remain closed 
for public use, and will be subject to further deterioration and 
damage from future earthquakes.  
Chile faces a challenge in rebuilding 190,000 destroyed and 
damaged houses, resettling the survivors living in temporary 
Figure 3: Talcahuano, BioBío province, Chile. Green areas are 
tsunami protection zones. (source:  Plan Región del Bío-Bío 
2010–2014, Santiago. 
villages (known as Aldeas), and replacing 30,000 units of so­
cial housing that do not meet current building codes and are 
structurally vulnerable. Overall, when built to modern codes, 
mid-rise buildings have performed well, with a few notable ex­
ceptions including two buildings in Concepción, Chile. 
Land use, a common thread 
Land use is a central issue in all of these recovery cases, but for 
different reasons. In Japan the issue expresses itself through 
location of safe residential areas from tsunamis, because these 
waves caused the greatest loss of life and mass evacuations. 
Evacuation safety can be achieved in different ways: moving 
far away from the risk (avoidance), building sea wall defenses, 
or providing evacuation strategies for buildings sited in precar­
ious places (e.g. develop strong buildings with protected stairs 
to reach floors higher than the oncoming waves) (Figure 2). 
Figure 4: East Hill Area of Greater Christchurch, landslide and land 
deformation damage. Note the use of shipping containers as 
temporary retaining wall.  (photo by the author) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
FOCUS  9  ■  ■ 47Siembieda: Multi Location Disaster in Three Countries 
Figure 5.  Framework of land use safety schemes. (author’s 
translation of Recovery Plan, Prefecture of Iwate, Japan) 
In many Chilean coastal communities the issues of tsunami pro­
tection and of liquefaction are present. Again communities are
faced with choices. The central government, however, has cho­
sen to implement expansion of sea barrier open parks through
expropriation of houses close to the ocean in at least the follow­
ing towns: Dichacto, Constitución and Talcahuana (Figure 3). In
each case, the people losing their homes were against this, but
were compensated at full value of their house and land. Con­
ducting the expropriation does take time and was required be­
fore housing was rebuilt in nearby areas with less tsunami risk.
The Canterbury region of New Zealand faces a series of land 
use issues, the largest being land damage from the earthquake 
causes liquefaction, vertical land level changes (e.g. streets 
higher than the driveways into adjacent houses) and lateral 
spreading under thousands of houses. Within one year, 100,000 
properties were surveyed for land damage. A cordon placed 
around the central business district forced many businesses 
to close, even if the buildings they occupied suffered less than 
terminal damage (Figure 4). Private companies working for the 
central government recovery agency determined the extent of 
liquefaction and damage to a property. More than half of the 
2,400 buildings in the central city area were severely damaged. 
In the end it was the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Agency 
that decided land use suitability and zoning. The local munici­
pality had a secondary role in this process. 
In Japan, while the earthquake caused damage to pre-1981 
built houses, overall it was minor. The major damage was 
caused by the tsunami. Thus all town and prefecture recovery 
plans address the need for more safety. The three main strate­
gies for this are shown in Figure 5: Avoid Risk, Separate Risk 
and Control Risk.  This is the central premise of all built environ­
ment recovery and community development plans. 
Dialogue 
This is the phase where a discussion of who does the recovery 
planning occurs. It includes issues of what to do (as the assess­
ment of damages is hopefully complete), how to do it, who 
pays, what standards need to be applied, what are the prin­
ciples of recovery, and who benefits from the process. 
The question of who does the planning is tied to some funda­
mental relationship between the central government and the
local community (the survivors and their local governments). In
multi-locational events that include many cities and towns this
can be a complex discussion. What one town wants may be not
what another wants or needs, especially if there are lots of towns
involved. Who decides where the resources will be allocated?
The comparative data in Table 2 speaks to this point in terms of
the very large number of impacted cities in Chile and Japan.
Chile 
Chile and Japan used community plans as a stepping stone for 
initial dialogue. The Chilean government provided funds and 
consulting support for two regional efforts to create munici­
pal recovery plans. One effort was in the Bío Bío Region, where 
the regional governor facilitated the design of 18 master plans 
for cities. Concepción, the region’s largest city conducted 
their own separate process. These plans, developed under the 
guidance of regional staff and consultants, worked with the 
local people to create a vision for reconstruction and identi­
fied the most important projects and areas that needed to be 
addressed. The plans however are not legal or binding docu­
ments. They are advisory to the local government, but could be 
adopted and integrated into the legal master plan. These plans 
also form the basis for a further level of discussion on specific 
areas and projects. These plans can also introduce hazard and 
inundation maps. 
The second Chilean plan effort provided funding for 27 recov­
ery plans to cities in the O’Higgins and Maule regions conduct­
ed with the assistance of a team from the  Pontificia Universi­
dad Catolia de Chile (PUC). Coastal plans and inland plans were 
developed along with extensive analysis of the geotecnical 
status of the communities. These plans, like those in Bío Bío are 
advisory to the local towns. All of these plans had a citizen par­
ticipation component and various levels of consult support. In 
at least three coastal towns the plans called for risk avoidance 
through expropriate of areas close to the ocean. 
Additional strategic recontruction plans were made for larger 
interior cities such as Talca and Curició. The Talca strategic 
plan was made with donated private funds, the assistance of 
a private consultant, under an agreement with the city gov­
ernment, the regional governor, and the housing ministry. The 
Curició plan was also conducted by a private consultant with 
donated funds, as well as from a local government and region­
al governor agreement. All of these plans have a public par­
ticipant component, but none give local community (neighor­
hood) groups shared governance in the plan making process. 
The community input is consultative. 
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Japan 
In Japan, all cities in the impacted Miyagi and Iwate impacted
prefectures, along with the prefectures, developed their own
plans within six months of the 2011 tsunami. These plans were
made with a mixture of volunteer professionals, consultants
and local residents. There was no central government oversight
in the plan making process, and the central government pro­
vided funds for consultant support in each municipality. Volun­
teer professionals from outside the community have played im­
portant roles in helping local neighborhoods sort out complex
technical issues related to seawall heights, elevation of land for
relocation areas, and population projects related to the need
for public buildings such as schools. The continued level of vol­
unteer support in Japan is impressive and useful, especially as
many survivors are living in scattered temporary shelters.
The central government’s Basic Guidelines for Recovery, issued 
four months after the tsunami, calls for a model that places the 
project planning at the municipal level and the project funding 
at the ministerial level. The plan sets down the town’s principles 
and vision. Overall, they call for the following: ensuring safety, 
rebuilding lives, and expansion of technology and natural re­
source based industry. The basic land use proposals generally 
are built around a chosen risk avoidance strategy. The plans 
function as the basis for developing specific recovery projects. 
There are many small bays along the varying topography of
what is called the Sanriku Coast. In each bay there is usually
at least one village, and some municipalities are composed of
many bays. There is a real planning challenge, as shown in Fig­
ure 6, where four towns were merged in 2005 to create Minani­
sanrikucho. Plans are needed for these smaller areas, each with
its own culture, economic base and land use and hazard profile.
New Zealand 
The New Zealand dialogue takes a different form. The central 
government created the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery 
Agency (CERA) with extensive powers to conduct the recovery 
planning for the district (that contains three cities and a district 
authority). The authority is located and operates from Christ-
church. Christchurch, the main city in the region, was tasked 
with developing only a Center Business District (CBD) Recovery 
Plan. The recovery strategy is developed by CERA itself, along 
with directing a special infrastructure reconstruction group 
known as Stronger Christchurch Infrastructure Rebuild Team 
(SCIRT ), a multi-jurisdictional public-private group for major 
infrastructure recovery, including a new wastewater plant, 
which incorporates hazard mitigation design. 
The city of Christchurch ran an extensive plan-making process 
for the central city, with the assistance of an urban design con­
sultant from Europe, and completed a series of community 
workshops and input sessions that yielded 104,000 sugges­
tions from people in the region. This plan was not adopted 
by the Christchurch City Council, but was sent to the central 
Figure 6. Minamisanrikucko, Myagi Prefecture, Japan. 
(source:  Ishikawa 2012a) 
government earthquake minister for review. The Minister has 
responded by calling for a special planning unit to be estab­
lished to propose a set of feasible projects in the CBD. The city’s 
CBD plan has not moved forward. 
Action 
Hopefully in this phase the decisions made in the other phases
of the framework lead to the allocation of resources (human,
governance, fiscal and physical) and action. In these countries
there exists a tension between central government ministries
and local government related to how, where and when recov­
ery occurs. This can lead to friction, as a local urban design proj­
ect will wait for funding until a larger regional transportation
improvement effort is completed. All of the countries present­
ed have made progress towards recovery, but in different ways.
Figure 7:  Proposed Reconstruction Zoning in Shizagawa Dis­
trict, Minamisanrickuho Municipality, Miyagi Prefecture, Japan. 
(source: Ishikawa, 2012b) 
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Chile 
Chile has been engaged in recovery for two full years. Among
the actions taken are:  rapid establishment of recovery funding,
a housing subsidy program, local planning efforts, assistance to
the fishing areas, and a separate effort for reconstruction of his­
toric buildings. The central government approved a multi-billion
dollars recovery budget. The division of labor to selected minis­
tries was quickly assigned and a plan for reconstruction issued
six months from the time of the disaster. The model used by the
central government for housing reconstruction involves subsi­
dies to low and modest income people who lost homes, with
the construction being done by the private sector. The private
sector is to obtain building permission from the local govern­
ment. Local government is charged with being the gatekeeper
for where to build, and also is the entity responsive for determin­
ing if the site is safe and can obtain needed infrastructure ser­
vices (water, power, etc.).  The private utility providers completed
major infrastructure recovery within three to twelve months.
At the end of the first year, 128,000 subsidies had been given, 
and by the end of the second year, all 220,000 were awarded 
(see Table 3). Transforming the subsidies into actual houses 
rested with the basic choice of using a market driven model 
and a local government gatekeeper model. Some cities have 
been only able to give permits for twenty houses. Due to the 
lag in performance, two years after the event, national legis­
lation was passed allowing the regional office of the Housing 
Ministry to provide direct assistance to some cities in order to 
increase housing production. This assistance will be done with 
the cooperation of local government, but the technical issues, 
including issuing needed permits, will be managed by the re­
gional office (Regional Secretariat for Housing and Planning). 
This action decreases the level of decentralized (local) control 
over the process, but will get more housing built. 
Criticism of the Chilean experience includes lack of community
input, poor design solutions for replacement housing in such
towns as Talca, and expropriation of lands adjacent to the Pacific
Ocean instead of a sea wall of sea barrier solution. Overall the
recovery has tested the capacity of local government to respond
more than the capacity of central government to lead. Criticism
Figure 8:  Christ Church Central 
City; proposed “Frame Plan”.
 (source: Christchurch Central 
Recovery Plan; CERA website) 
over vernacular design solutions may not be well founded as
each local government has final approval of projects.
Japan 
During the sixteen months since the 2011 tsunami, Japan has 
been faced with stabilizing a nuclear accident, building 55,000 
units of temporary houses, making new estimates of its earth­
quake predication and tsunami models, creating a central gov­
ernment reconstruction agency, and committing multi-billions 
of dollars in recovery assistance. Within nine months, 90% of 
the work lost had been replaced (through a combination of 
getting employers back in business, new business and recov­
ery job creation schemes). The reconstruction agency is called 
the “one-stop shop,” however, it is the separate ministries that 
draw up the guidelines for project applications and control re­
sources. ( This includes the most powerful agency, the Minis­
try of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism.) While it is a 
bottoms up process from the local level, the issuing of project 
funds is a top down process. This process worked well enough 
to issue 2.5 trillion yen in combined support less than one year 
after the event, with 44% of the funds being housing related. 
Uncertainty is the operative word about the long-term outcome
of the Fukushima Dai Ichi nuclear plant clean up and remedia­
tion of surrounding lands. The nuclear plants remain unstable
and present a difficult decommissioning task. This is being ad­
dressed by a separate new nuclear commission under the Min­
istry of the Environment, and is outside the purview of the Re­
construction Agency. In sixteen months, a plan for rezoning the
towns that fall under the evacuation zone has been developed,
and a program to purchase properties within the restricted zone
as well as compensation for loss of livelihood has been estab­
lished. Japan’s Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage (1961),
in its infancy, places no cap on the operator’s nuclear liability.
New Zealand 
The New Zealand situation reflects various levels of complex­
ity. After twenty months, technical analysis of the areas in the 
Canterbury region with soil damage have been completed and 
all neighborhoods know if they can rebuild or not. While the 
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government has acquired almost half of the “7,000 red zone” 
properties, the other half are still being processed. This is a dif­
ficult and time-consuming process because some people do 
not wish to sell out to the government even though remaining 
there means having no infrastructure services provided. The 
final agreements between the Earthquake Commission (the 
Crown insurance entity) and the reinsurers are still to be made. 
SCIRT is doing well in forging new levels of partnership gov­
ernance for DDR infrastructure in the region. This means the 
engineering focus is now on mitigation of risk, not on cost con­
tainment. This is a significant step forward in holistic recovery. 
The final CERA Recovery Strategy document and a central city 
development plan was announced in August 2012. This plan 
is the result of New Zealand consultant consortium of design 
and project management professionals, and will focus on a 
defined central city area. It is here that urban design should 
make its best contribution. This plan will replace the one drawn 
up and adopted created by the Christ Church City Council in 
December 2011. This plan reflects the power of CERA as an ex­
tension of the central government and also a rejection of the 
previous plan making process. 
The New Zealand insurance scheme is unique in the world and 
complicates this recover. Over 90% of the country’s population 
holds seismic insurance coverage for the house, the contents 
and the land under the house. This large coverage is possible 
as the seismic insurance is a required add-on to fire insurance, 
which most people buy. There are two payers of the coverage in 
case of a claim: a government agency known as the Earthquake
Commission (EQC) and private insurers (local companies and
re-insurance companies). The EQC is liable for the first $100,000
of property damage (including land damage) and $20,000 in
personal property. Claims above this amount are to be paid by
the private insurer. Because there were so many earthquakes
in the area, some 459,000 claims have been filled to date and a
total of $AU 3.77 billion have been paid as of October 1, 2011.
This is almost twice the total residential housing stock (220,000)
of the Canterbury area. The high number of claims is due to
multiple earthquakes. New Zealand is unique in the world in
this type of seismic coverage, where the vast majority of people
participate.  For the most part this makes it far easier to address
the permanent housing replacement needs. The challenge for
planning is where to locate the permanent housing. 
The Recovery Strategy focuses on identifying work to be pro­
grammed. This work is linked to a set of nine CERA priorities, 
the top five being: safety and well being, investment condi­
tions, infrastructure repair, supply of land for recovery needs, 
and coordinated work across central governments, local au­
thorities, insurers, and the private sector. 
Discussion 
All of these countries have made people’s safety the first pri­
ority. Each is using land use controls, new building codes and 
improved standards for location of shelter, commerce and civic 
structures in creating the new urban form for the multitude of 
cities that need assistance. 
Due to the nuclear accident, Japan faces the most complicated 
recovery task, but it has the most contemporary experience 
with recovery and a national consensus to rebuild livelihoods 
as well as the built environment. In many ways Chile has recov­
ered quickly, and has provided its cities and towns with new 
technical information on which to make future land use deci­
sions. After eighteen months of deciding where not to build, 
and a commitment to mitigation of its infrastructure risk, Christ 
Church is ready to rebuild. It still faces challenges of paying to 
rebuild confidence that it is a safe place. Each has used a differ­
ent government-civic-private sector model, in part based on 
its fiscal capacity and its legal and cultural views of recovery. 
All, in a real sense, look towards the market (the private sector)
for positive long-term recovery. All, in some way, have also real­
ized that all levels of government have a special responsibility to
protect its people. Hopefully they will take this lesson to heart
and prioritize safety for the homes and well-being of people. 
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